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Abstract: This is an exploratory study of populist political movement Sme rodina 
– Boris Kollár (We Are a Family – Boris Kollár, since November 2019 only Sme 
rodina). The paper first locates this movement into a lose concept/sui generis family 
of political parties (the niche party), arguing in contrast to some typologies that this 
is primarily protest populist party presenting some niche issues, and only secondarily, 
an entrepreneurial party. The paper also answers the question why this party is con-
sidered as being populist by many political and non-political actors and analysts. The 
paper also suggests that there is actually non-existent, but assumed direct correlation 
between the support for this party and the decline in the standard of living, as some-
times presented in public discourse. In contrast, it is suggested here that there may 
be stronger links between relative poverty, feeling of being abandoned by political 
elites/parties, and low educational levels. Moreover, there played an important role 
previous knowledge (celebrity status) of the party leader who was often presented and 
discussed in tabloid media. For this reason, many young females voted for this party. 
The party also managed to raise a widely perceived problematic issue that was seen 
as not tackled sufficiently or at all by the previous governments and other competing 
political parties (the niche or salient issue).
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Introduction
Firstly, it should be highlighted that the article deals with an explor-atory research, which is a non-formal research. Exploratory stud-
ies define a range of causes and research issues, as well as alternative 
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options for a solution of a specific problem. Exploratory studies ap-
ply limited or no rules for collecting data. Nevertheless, exploration 
can produce valid findings relevant for social sciences, provided they 
are conducted in a transparent and self-reflexive way (Reiter, 2017). 
Exploratory studies are usually connected with inductive reasoning. In 
such reasoning, validity and reliability of conclusions are limited. The 
main outcome of such research is extension, expansion and diversifica-
tion of insights and frameworks, and the expectation that it will enable 
to perceive more, better and differently complex and blurred issues, and 
that eventually, it will be possible to make sense of what was previ-
ously found meaningless or difficult to explain (Reiter, 2017, p. 139). 
Thus, exploratory inductive research allows for limited or preliminary 
generalizations (Reiter, 2017, p. 141). In short, exploratory research is 
not intended to provide conclusive evidence, but it helps us to have a 
better understanding of the problem. Considering that populist move-
ments and parties, and in fact populism as such are extremely difficult 
to study and generalise, this approach is certainly justified. The main 
problem with traditional scientific methods is that they either allow to 
study a niche issue in detail (for an academic article) or expect that 
there will be a book format with both complex and in-depth analysis. 
For important in-between research area, there is a room for exploratory 
research. Moreover, as put by K. Popper: “Knowledge consists in the 
search for truth – the search for objectively true, explanatory theories. 
...It is not the search for certainty.”
The increasing support to populist and anti-establishment political 
parties is not a new trend in Europe, since it has been seen for more 
than the last two decades (Heinisch, Holtz-Bacha, Mazzoleni, 2017). 
This could also be seen in Central Europe (Ágh, 2018). In Slovakia, 
the presence of populism has been most critical in mid of the 1990s 
(Školkay, 2000), and then again – according to some analysts – around 
the turn of century (Gyárfášová, Mesežnikov, 2008). Carpenter (1997) in 
much cited work titled tellingly “Slovakia and the triumph of nationalist 
populism” offered culture-based explanation of emergence of populism. 
Specifically, in his view, there emerged or rather survived two types of 
political cultures and institutions in post-communist countries – “tra-
ditional” and “civic.” Thus, legacies of political subjugation and back-
ward socio-economic conditions allegedly led to populism, while civic 
political cultures and institutions arose as a result of greater political 
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autonomy and industrialization. In hindsight, this explanation – popu-
lar among historians and some sociologists – did not survive the test of 
truth. From a historical perspective, one can find populism more politi-
cally autonomous in industrialised countries, such as the US or Austria 
(Hobelt, 2003).
In any case, at a political party level in Slovakia, we have witnessed 
continuation of these political developments:
a) continuous emergence of anti-establishment or protest (and part-
ly or fully populist) parties and movements: ZRS (The Associa-
tion of Workers of Slovakia, in government in 1994–1998), OĽaNO 
(Ordinary People and Independent Personalities, for some time with 
suffix NOVA, further OĽaNO), Sme	rodina	–	Boris	Kollár (We are 
a Family – Boris Kollár, further WAF-BK);
b) long-term tendency of founding political (partly or fully pop-
ulist) parties by wealthy entrepreneurs: Alliance of a New Citi-
zen (ANO, founded in 2001 and dissolved in 2011), SaS (Freedom 
and Solidarity, founded in 2009), WAF-BK, and most recently, 
a new party Za	 ľudí (For the People), led by the former Presi-
dent Andrej Kiska, a former successful businessman, and a new 
non-parliamentary political party of Progresívne	Slovensko	(Pro-
gressive	Slovakia), initially funded by five and later supported by 
three businessmen;
c) new popularity of populist far-right movements and political 
parties (Kotleba-ĽSNS (Kotleba – People´s Party – Our Slovakia), 
in the National Parliament since 2016, and in the European Parlia-
ment since 2019).
Although an entrepreneurial party ANO was already in government 
in 2002–2005, since the parliamentary elections in 2010, we have wit-
nessed growing popularity of entrepreneurial parties, i.e. parties found-
ed by businessmen (former or present). Their electoral support has in-
creased from 12.14% in 2010 to almost 30% in 2016. The list includes 
three parliamentary parties: SaS, OĹaNO and WAF-BK (Marušiak, 
2017, p. 182). Out of these three, two are entrepreneurial parties which 
also show (many or all) key characteristics of being populist. These are 
OĽaNO	and WAF-BK.	Their business background and the lack of clear 
ideological preferences may have a crucial impact on the democratic 
party system in general.
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Origin of We Are a Family – Boris Kollár
The political movement of the WAF-BK was established in No-
vember 2015. Already from its founding, it took an unorthodox ap-
proach. Instead of gradually attracting grass-root supporters, Boris 
Kollár simply purchased one of many already established but inactive 
political parties. Strana	občanov	Slovenska (acronym SOS, Party of 
Citizens of Slovakia) was then renamed and adjusted to the needs of 
a new political movement. Nevertheless, in the March 2016 Parlia-
mentary elections, it won 11 parliamentary seats with 6.62% electoral 
support.
On the communication level, the political marketing and cam-
paigning was developed around the founder/leader Boris Kollár. Key 
negative messages during their pre-election campaign were twofold: 
fighting against domestic political elites and spreading fear towards 
immigrants (Zvada, 2016, pp. 228–229). These messages had been dis-
seminated mainly via Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram, especially 
via selfie video posts (Zvada, 2016, pp. 228–229). Slosiarik, a sociolo-
gist, stated that for the first time social media played an important role 
in elections in Slovakia (Sme, December 31, 2016, p. 2).	Some students 
(usually girls) who often followed Boris Kollár´s on Facebook believed 
that he appeared to be a sincere and nice person (Goliaš, Hajko, Piško, 
2017). In addition, Kollár relied on radical ultra-conservative and Eu-
rosceptic websites of Konzervatívny	 výber	 –	 Conservative	 Choice, 
run by another co-founder Milan Krajniak, and Medzičas	–	Meantime 
(Marušiak, 2017, p. 193). Boris Kollár videos were the most popular, 
as all of them focused not on the agenda but on his personality and his 
attitudes towards politicians as such. The main slogan of his electoral 
campaign was ‘I	don’t	vote	for	politicians,	I	vote	for	Boris’ (Marušiak, 
2017, p. 193).
Several students in focus groups expressed their opinion that since 
Kollár was rich, he did not enter politics to get richer (Goliaš, Hajko, 
Piško, 2017, p. 24). The party/movement was able to attract protest-
ing voters and voters with anti-establishment attitudes (Gyárfášová, 
Bahna, Slosiarik, 2017). There was a higher ratio of female to men 
(64:36%) among WAF-BK voters. Moreover, the most typical voter 
age group included people between 22 to 39 (half of all voters for the 
party, but only fifth largest cohort in this age group among all parties) 
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and the most typical educational level of voters was high school (Fo-
cus Agency exit poll, in Kern, 2016). WAF-BK voters were less aware 
of the link between the quality of democracy and the quality of life, 
which explains their willingness to vote for a party promoting radical 
solutions in many public policy areas (Goliaš, Hajko, Piško, 2017, 
p. 126). Compared to other voters, they were slightly less willing to 
leave the EU, although still in favour of it (Goliaš, Hajko, Piško, 2017, 
p. 126). However, the exit poll research suggests that voters tend to 
show their preferences towards the WAF-BK for a number of reasons, 
especially their appreciation of its ‘social programme’ (see Figure 1 
below).
Figure 1. Reasons to voting for Sme Rodina – Boris Kollár
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Source: FOCUS Agency, exit poll, 2016.
Obviously, a “social programme” is a broad term. Slosiarik suggests 
that this can also mean “amnesty for debtors or excessive rewards for 
executors” (in Kern, 2016). This is a niche issue that played an important 
role in the party appeal and it is going to be discussed in detail in the 
further part of the article.
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Which main populist features does We are a Family – Boris Kollár 
include?
As already discussed, especially since the parliamentary elections in 
2010, there has been a growing popularity of what some label primarily 
as entrepreneurial parties, i.e. political parties founded by businessmen 
(former or current) in Slovakia. Their electoral support, measured by the 
number of seats in the Parliament, has more than doubled in the past six 
years (Marušiak, 2017, p. 182).
Hloušek and Kopeček (2017a) offer a general concept of an entrepre-
neurial party, which emerges from a previous concept of “the business-
firm model.” The entrepreneurial party concept is based on the central 
role of a leader and his private initiative. The leader/founder is a pro-
moter/sponsor of a political organisation or a social movement. Logi-
cally, a party is their “personal vehicle.” However, while Hloušek and 
Kopeček (2017a) emphasise the crucial formative influence of a leader 
over the political project, the case of the WAF-BK appears to be slightly 
different in this respect. This is related to the role of Milan Krajniak, ap-
parently the key ideologist of the WAF-BK	and the second most visible 
representative of the party, who also ran for the president of the country 
as the WAF-BK candidate in 2019.
Marušiak (2017) includes among Slovak entrepreneurial parties some 
political projects that no longer exist, such as the Party of Civic Un-
derstanding (SOP) and the ANO. However, certain popular parties and 
movements, such as the Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), OĽaNO and the 
WAF-BK	still exist and could be defined as entrepreneurial or business-
firm political parties. Nevertheless, the article argues that these do not 
share the most relevant characteristics from ideological or programme 
points of view. In the end, it is less relevant who founded a party than 
what its goals are. We are going to discuss this issue in the further part of 
the article. We would like to point out that Slovakia is not the only coun-
try in Central Europe that has had entrepreneurial or business-firm model 
political parties. Examples of such political parties are also observed 
in Poland (Kosowska-Gąstoł, Sobolewska-Myślik, 2017), as well as the 
Czech Republic (Hloušek, Kopeček, 2017b; Cirhan, Kopecký, 2017). 
Nonetheless, while the concept of an entrepreneurial party explains its 
unique or at least non-traditional way of establishing and funding, there 
is still room to study its ideology and rhetoric. Not all entrepreneurial 
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parties show key features of populism, including anti-elitism: discredit-
ing the elite, blaming the elite, separating the elite from the society, or 
in short, using a dichotomy of good and evil, then restoring the sov-
ereignty of People with reference to the “will” of the people (denying 
power to current elite and demanding power for the people). Finally, 
there is the people centrism: stressing virtues of the people, consider-
ing the people as a monolith structure, showing closeness to the people) 
(Werner et al, 2016, p. 52). Werner et al. (2016) do not mention three 
additional features of populism, i.e. the comparison with more ideologi-
cal and/or radical parties: At the same time, populism is not revolution-
ary and does not show anti-democratic tendencies at large. Yet it is 
against additional liberal features of the liberal democracy (checks 
and balances, rights of minorities, etc.). Moreover, populists usually use 
the “othering” strategy, i.e. they exclude some segments of a society.
As mentioned above, there are two entrepreneurial parties in the 
Slovak Parliament that at the same time show all key characteristics of 
populist parties: OĽaNO	and WAF-BK.	 In fact, if the funding and es-
tablishing models are considered to be an entrepreneurial characteristic, 
populism can be seen as its political message. Therefore, it is perhaps 
more useful to focus on the main category, which is populism, and con-
sider explanatory characteristics of the entrepreneurial political party as 
a secondary issue. If we follow this line of argumentation, one can find 
further theoretical classification in four ideal types of new political par-
ties stemming from political projects that they pursue (Lucardie, 2000, 
in Gyárfášová, 2018, p. 113). These are: 1) ‘Prophetic’ parties (articu-
late new ideologies), 2) ‘Purifiers’ or challengers (their main motto is 
to ‘cleanse’ the political system off corruption), 3) ‘Prolocutors’ (they 
represent interests disregarded by other parties), 4) Personal vehicles 
(or idiosyncratic parties – these seem to overlap with the model of entre-
preneurial parties described above).
Firstly, the WAF-BK includes first and seemingly the most impor-
tant sub-characteristic of personal vehicles/entrepreneurial parties. 
This means that all other members and candidates of this party have 
been relatively unknown (first of all its leader, Boris Kollár, and Mar-
tina Šimkovičová, a female anchor from a major private TV channel 
Markíza). Only some of the top representatives and later MPs of this po-
litical party were politically experienced and partly known to the public 
(Milan Krajniak, Peter Pčolinský, to certain extent also Peter Marček, 
12	 Andrej	Školkay,	Viera	Žúborová	 ŚSP 4 ’19
president of SOS party). Boris Kollár was not only a famous playboy 
(having ten children with nine women, and still being single), but first 
of all, he had money to finance his political enterprise. Therefore, the 
role of the founder and leader was put in the forefront in the election 
campaign.
Secondly, a more important sub-feature of the WAF-BK is its role as 
‘Prolocutors’. Its major specific “positive” agenda (not just criticising, 
but making promises or suggesting solutions) shortly after the establish-
ment was to eliminate the distrain of debtors. Previously, this issue was 
actually ignored by analysts. In addition, this issue was by and large 
ignored in programmes of major political parties that run in 2016 Parlia-
mentary elections. Indeed, Dalmus (2018) suggests that the lack of en-
gagement in a salient issue seems to open up opportunities for a populist 
party. The incapacity of citizens to manage their own finances has been 
actually a major issue neglected by the government for years. Accord-
ing to the then estimates 40–60,000 people had been seriously indebted 
that it did not make sense for them to search for a job in the early 2017. 
Additionally, there were 34,000 pensioners whose pensions were cut by 
executors. At that time, the total number of partially distrained debts was 
around 3.5–3.7 million in a country with population of 5.4 million peo-
Figure 2. Where does WAF-BK voters come from?
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Source: Focus Agency Exit Poll, in Kern, 2016.
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ple. More than 10% of debtors had multiple debts (KRUK, 2018). This 
critical and widespread issue was finally tackled by the government and 
Parliament in April–May 2019. Of course, the WAF-BK competed with 
some other parties that promoted other agendas seen as insufficiently 
addressed by the government, such as the perceived threat of immigra-
tion, “Brussel’s elite or European integration pace,” or long-term cor-
ruption (see Gyárfášová, 2018, p. 125). In contrast to some analysts, and 
their comments about the election campaign discussed above, or perhaps 
in contrast to the WAF-BK’s	focus on immigration in the 2016 election 
campaign, as compared to electorates of other parties, WAF-BK voters 
considered this topic to be the least important (but still very high on 
the agenda). However, voters of the WAF-BK	were also apparently the 
second least opposed of further European integration (but still mostly 
adversarial).
Thirdly,	WAF-BK´s could be seen as ‘Purifiers’ or challengers to the 
establishment (to be discussed in next section). However, it competed 
either with a movement already represented in the Parliament (OĽANO) 
or with a new more radical political actor, the extreme right-wing party 
ĽSNS. Although the largest part of supporters did not vote previously, 
almost two thirds of WAF-BK voters were “defectors” from former sup-
porters of other established political parties.
Finally, the WAF-BK	cannot be called a ‘Prophetic’ party, since it 
does not articulate any specific traditional or radically new ideology, but 
it is rather eclectic in this aspect. Perhaps what could be seen as ‘Pro-
phetic’ was the focus on a major salient issue discussed below.
The analysis of the party (leader) rhetoric/ideology/programme
This section is based on a) conclusions and observations by other 
authors and projects, b) content analysis of the Party Programme, c) con-
tent analysis of the most popular and most popular Boris Kollár vid-
eos on Facebook. In May 2019, Kollár had significantly more follow-
ers (124,000) than the party itself (82,553 followers). Initially, priorities 
of the movement included the protection of family values, protection 
of the country against the external “threats” allegedly represented by 
immigrants from the Middle East, and improvement of conditions for 
business. Garaj (2018, p. 151) highlights that key topics of the party 
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included anti-corruption, anti-immigration, foreign affairs and agricul-
ture, namely protection of domestic production and producers. However, 
Kollár himself avoided discussing ideology. When asked if he is more 
conservative or liberal, he used the famous statement by Deng Xiaoping 
‘it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black	or white, if it catches mice it is 
a good cat’ (Marušiak, 2017, p. 193).
In 2018, key topics presented by the WAF-BK in the public agenda 
included agriculture and sufficient production of domestic food (aim of 
self-sufficiency). In the early 2019, the key agenda included protection 
of borders, tradition and social welfare (Aktuality.sk, 2019).
In the late 2018, Kollár acknowledged that his programme was eclec-
tic: “selecting issues and topics «per partes» (TASR, 2019).
The following analysis shows how rhetoric and ideas presented in 
the programme are populist and demagoguery in terms of their style and 
content. The analysis is based on criteria of populist rhetoric as sum-
marised by Werner et al. (2016):
a) evidence of claims for restoring sovereignty of people with refer-
ence to the “will” of the people (denying power to elite and demand-
ing power for the people);
a) evidence of the people centrism (stressing virtues of the people, 
depicting society as monolithic structure, showing closeness to the 
people);
a) evidence of anti-elitism (discrediting the elite, blaming it and sepa-
rating it from the people).
We can add the fourth, fifth and sixth aspects, namely the lack of 
revolutionary goals and anti-liberal attitudes, and the othering strat-
egy. Obviously, sometimes there is an overlap. Interestingly, all above 
mentioned key criteria suggested by Werner et al can be ultimately seen 
as fundamentally opposed to liberal aspects of liberal democracy.
According to the analysis of the communication of the WAF-BK, the 
main claims towards sovereignty of the people can be found in the fol-
lowing sub-indicators:
a) claiming popular sovereignty and conflictive denial of power through 
improving direct democracy in Slovakia:
“The aim of our proposed amendment is to strengthen the right of 
the citizens of the Slovak Republic to participate in the adminis-
tration of public affairs through the institute of referendum. Such 
strengthening of citizen participation in the decision-making pro-
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cesses is necessary because political parties do not protect the pub-
lic interest but the interest of financial groups” (WAF-BK, 2019).
b) conflictive denial of power through the critique of supranational 
governance – the European Union: Kollár labelled the EU bureau-
cracy as “euro-rubbish”	(Zvala, 2016, p. 229). After the migration 
protests in Germany, Kollár recommended to Germans to remove 
the “witch-chancellor,” Angela Merkel (Zvala, 2016, p. 229). More-
over, the WAF-BK stated that it: “...refuses to continue in policies 
of stealing, lying and cheating that are typical for so called standard 
political parties” (SME RODINA, 2016). The key message during 
the EU election campaign of 2019 was “Less	Brussels,	More	Com-
mon	Sense.”
The second dimension – people centrism rhetoric can be found in 
the political communication of the WAF-BK. The WAF-BK has built up 
its communication strategy on the classic populist division between the 
people and corrupted political parties/elites/oligarchs.
B. Kollár: “There already have been parties like HZDS, Smer-SD, 
and SNS that focused on the top 10,000. Then, there were parties 
like SDKÚ-DS and SaS that favoured especially those successful 
who account for about half a million in our society. We focus on 
the remaining five million of who practically nobody has cared for 
in the last 25 years” (TASR, 2019).
Vladimir Mečiar (former P.M.) and Robert Fico (former 
P.M.) “sold” the Slovak Republic to oligarchs, while former 
P. M. Mikuláš Dzurinda helped to repay the debts of banks. But 
we from the WAF-BK will cover debts of common people from 
the state budget (Čas, 2019).
In perhaps the most popular video on Facebook (1.3 million views, 
uploaded on January 2019), B. Kollár presented himself as a “preg-
nant man” in front of the Labour Office, arguing that two unemployed 
men were found in registry in the category of “pregnant.” Pregnancy 
prevents the Office from releasing an unemployed person from evi-
dence. However, this criticism was not targeted at the men, but at the 
employment policies. Kollár also eclectically mentioned “third gen-
der ideology.” In general, his criticism addressed governmental ef-
forts to lower unemployment by forcing unemployed people to accept 
any jobs, which allegedly leads also to a new category of a “pregnant 
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man” being created for such a purpose (to lower official unemploy-
ment figures).
Thirdly, negative attributes of elites (anti-elitism) were also empha-
sised in the political communication of the WAF-BK. This was used as 
a strategy to discredit political elites and to put them in the same group 
with “bad” oligarchs.
Against	internal	threats	–	local	oligarchy/financial	groups	(SME 
RODINA, 2016).
“The government designs such policies that redistribute the values 
of Slovak economy unfairly, and the vast majority is consumed by 
a group of oligarchs and financial groups” (Čas, 2019).
In one of the most popular videos on Facebook (400,000 views), 
uploaded in December 4, 2018, B. Kollár criticised the decision of the 
Parliament to loosen the rules for foreign workers to be employed in 
Slovakia. Kollár repeated some key negative terms aimed explicitly at 
coalition leaders and expressed his negative attitude toward their poli-
cies: “drag in cheap foreign workers, social evil, parasites, oligarchs, 
self-interests, insufficient funds to cover current minimum wage require-
ments for some publicly funded institutions, social suicides in the past 
due to unemployment, increase local salaries instead, and sponsoring 
grand capital with cheap labour.”
In the	most	liked Facebook video (562,000 views, published in early 
2018), B. Kollár accused the ruling “standard” politicians in general, 
and the Speaker of the Parliament in particular, of stealing, lying and 
cheating, as well as of being nasty. This was, interestingly, as Kollár 
mentioned, reaction to another video in which the Speaker invited him to 
a televised public debate.
Despite the fact that all key populist dimensions are visible in the 
communication and in the WAF-BK programme, as mentioned, we need 
to add the fourth dimension “No evidence of a revolutionary/radical/
extremist policies” as well as of not having anti-democratic tendencies 
at large, or a lack of such contrary evidence. This indicator is necessary 
in order to separate between populist parties and nationalist, far-right or 
far left ideological parties such as communist or fascists. This is not to 
deny that both these ideologies appeal to populist rhetoric – however, 
their core is clearly ideological. Indeed, in a rather detailed Party Mani-
festo of 2016, one cannot find any revolutionary messages.
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The leader of the WAF-BK also claimed in the past that he was open 
to any kind of negotiation with everyone inside or outside of the par-
liament. This proves that the WAF-BK was trying to display itself as 
non-ideological political force that keeps its promise to promote their 
programme for the people under any conditions.
“I am willing to negotiate with every parliamentary political party 
after the election. I will talk with Mr. Kotleba, with Smer-SD (Di-
rection – Social Democracy) and also with Mr. Sulík (SaS – Free-
dom and Solidarity). But I do not know if I would like to rule with 
those who are leading Smer-SD or with the Slovak nationalists. 
At the same time, we are convinced, that in these parties there are 
also decent people, they are just not getting the chance at the mo-
ment” (etrend.sk, 2018).
Finally, some tentative anti-liberal attitudes can be found in the 
2016 Party Manifesto. For example, there is an idea “to merge in-
dividual state and public institutions and their competencies and 
to cancel self-governing regions.” Kollár rejects possible coalition 
with ĽSNS (etrend.sk, 2018). Thus, some key aspects of his eclectic 
ideology or rather rhetoric are not anti-liberal. Nonetheless, perhaps 
the most relevant anti-liberal element, and at the same time clearly 
populist rhetoric, can be found in the party stance towards refugees. 
For example, “Millions of people are arriving to Europe who have 
fundamentally different cultural habits from us. These people have 
definitely decided not to accommodate themselves to our way of life. 
On the contrary, they want us to adjust to their life-style” (SME RO-
DINA, 2016).
The	WAF-BK programme is eclectic, but clearly with an anti-es-
tablishment focus. There are only minimal direct anti-liberal elements 
in both the programme and rhetoric. In fact, a direct attack on liber-
alism is to be found mainly in the strong anti-immigrant attitudes or 
in the so called anti-gender ideology (which was topical in the early 
2019 in public discourse). However, their attitude towards “corrupted 
elites,” suggests an anti-liberal stance. There is no presence of anti-
democratic or revolutionary goals either in the rhetoric or in the pro-
gramme. Yet there is “othering strategy” present, very much visible in 
its programme and anti-immigrant rhetoric (this issue is not discussed 
in detail here due to the lack of space, just briefly mentioned at the be-
ginning of this section).
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Scan 1. FB Page of Boris Kollár
The text reads: “Sme rodina Boris Kollár. Non-standard party. We 
do not make dirty business. We are helping.”
Source: https://www.facebook.com/Boris-Kollar-1464024763918594/, 26 March 2019.
Is this party considered populist by the broader society  
and other political actors?
There is no consensus how to label such a party. Based on the analy-
sis of its rhetoric, party programme and non-ideological background of 
the self-labelled “non-standard” party/movement, the WAF-BK perhaps 
could be defined as a populist entrepreneurial protest political project.
The categorisation is also supported by the following statements. For 
example, Gyárfášová, Bahna and Slosiarik (2017) define	WAF-BK	and 
the extreme-right ĽSNS primarily as	the	new	anti-system	parties.	In con-
trast, Goliaš, Hajko and Piško (2017, 15) call the WAF-BK	a populist po-
litical body. Be that as it may, explicitly or implicitly, most local experts 
agree that this party (as well as ĽSNS)	should be seen in a morally nega-
tive light. Local experts believe of all political parties, the Kotleba-ĽSNS 
followed closely by the WAF-BK were mainly	 harmful	 to democracy, 
while the SNS and Smer-SD are seen as rather	harmful to democracy. 
No political party is seen as making substantial contributions to democ-
racy. Parties such as the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement, non-
parliamentary party), SaS,	Most-Híd and OĽANO are seen as slightly 
contributing to the development of democracy (Goliaš, Hajko, Piško 
2017, p. 10). On the other hand, a conservative journalist Martin Hanus 
suggests that the WAF-BK is a social-nationalist	 movement (Mrvová, 
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2018). Gyárfášová (2018, p. 124) suggests that the WAF-BK is possibly 
an alternative to the OĽaNO for the young generation. Garaj (2018, pp. 
150–151) puts the WAF-BK among “centre-right	subjects	with	conserva-
tive	attitudes,” although he mentions that the party does not have clear 
ideological profile but “rather reflects current issues according to their 
attractiveness.”
The	WAF-BK is seen not only by local scholars and commentators 
through negative connotations and anti-elitist attitudes. Foreign observ-
ers are also inclined to share this view. The WAF-BK is seen as a hard-core	
anti-Western political party ranked 22nd in terms of ideological-political 
attitudes. For example, the Kotleba-ĽSNS is on the second position after 
Ataka in Bulgaria at the same list (Fouloy, 2019). In contrast, the BTI re-
port (2018) defines the WAF-BK as a populist	xenophobic	political party 
that is rather built around a personality than a social programme. The 
communication and rhetoric style of its founder and leader Boris Kollár 
is defined as a mixture of “an anti-politics appeal and rude xenophobic 
messages with stress on his business career and personal wealth” (BTI, 
2018). Stojarová (2018, p. 34) defined the WAF-BK as “clearly populist 
subject still lacking any ideology.” Finally, it is important to note that in 
February 2019, the WAF-BK joined a somewhat new movement of Eu-
rope of Nations and Freedoms led by the Italian populist Matteo Salvini.
What is a relative weight/importance of populism compared to other 
elements in this case?
Interestingly, Čekmeová (2016) argues that there is no significant evi-
dence that the growth in the support for populists in Slovakia has been 
caused by unfavourable economic conditions. The same conclusion can 
be drawn from comparison of regional development and votes in favour 
of populist parties. There is no systematic tendency to prefer populist 
parties (measured by the parties´ shares in votes) in average or in poorer 
regions (Čekmeová, 2016). Comparatively, Slovakia does show overall 
positive to medium or average results in almost all social and income 
levels inequality indicators (Blanchet, Chancel, Gethin, 2019). Although 
main economic indicators seem to be indecisive, some less visible local 
economic and social factors could play a more substantial role in the 
increasing support for populist parties, since many of them are present in 
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their electoral programme. For example, Sharma (2016, p. 100) argues 
that it is “often the perception of inequality, even more than the reality, 
that shapes the political reaction and economic cycles.” Furthermore, 
inequality has economic and political consequences “when the popula-
tion turns suspicious of the way wealth is being created” (Sharma, 2016, 
p. 99). Clearly, the support for populist parties is not caused by an abso-
lute drop in the standard of living, because the opposite is true (Goliaš, 
Hajko, Piško 2017, p. 17). Most likely, it is caused by persisting or only 
slightly shrinking regional differences in the standard of living and rela-
tive poverty. Pauhofová, Stehlíková, Staněk and Páleník (2018, p. 7) re-
port “extremely serious situation” with respect to “disposable income” 
and “rapidly growing indebtedness of households.” Furthermore, they 
identify such major problems as “working poor” and “people living at 
the edges of a society,” so called “precariat” (Pauhofová et al., 2018, 
pp. 7–8). Most importantly, the authors suspect that growth of consump-
tion reported at a macro-level has been most likely the result of debts 
and loans contracted rather than an increase in income (Pauhofová et al, 
2018, p. 30, see more on complexity of personal income and well-being 
in Kopcsayová, 2019). This leads us back to the concept of a niche party 
and salient issues. Apparently, the WAF-BK has managed to discover 
and exploit important niche issues.
In general, it appears that that the support for populist protest parties, 
either their softer versions (such as WAF-BK) or harder, anti-system ver-
sions (such as ĽSNS)	can be seen as, indeed, a subjectively justified pro-
test or a fight against traditional political parties/elites in both cases, and 
as a voice against the political system expressed by a number of voters.
Conclusion
The purpose of the article is to provide an exploratory overview of the 
populist movement WAF-BK. Of course, this analytical exercise could 
cover only some relevant issues. Nonetheless, the analysis has both aca-
demic and policy relevance that may also be useful for further academic 
studies and policy recommendations. Moreover, there are some tangible, 
although inevitably preliminary findings.
The WAF-BK represents an entrepreneurial self-defined “non-stan-
dard” niche issues and it is a specific protest populist political party or 
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a movement. While the ‘entrepreneurial’ feature defines its establish-
ment and initial financial support, populism defines its political rhetoric 
and strategy. The niche aspect defines its ability to discover and utilise 
some neglected but important issues. The WAF-BK attracted voters in 
the 2016 parliamentary elections for several reasons, mainly due to its 
‘social programme.’ Voters with a low level of education and low income 
are more likely to feel threatened by the developmental gap (relative 
poverty or relative decline in standard of living – precariat or working 
poor). It should be mentioned that the WAF-BK put a new topic into 
its agenda, a topic which has been ignored by all major parties – high 
level of private individual debts. Voters felt abandoned by the political 
elite of major parties. Therefore, they preferred “a new party” or the 
“lesser evil.” This position certainly explains support for anti-establish-
ment or protest parties. The exit poll findings confirm that two thirds 
of voters supporting the WAF-BK voted previously for well-established 
parties, while one third of voters did not participate at elections previ-
ously. However, considering the similarity of programmes of different 
competing parties (save for important exception – niche issue of private 
indebtedness), and since voters usually do not read programmes (party 
manifestos), one can assume that the role of the leader – entrepreneurial 
celebrity – is perhaps a more important factor while deciding to vote 
for this particular party. Kollár promoted the agenda of his party so it 
became well-known.
WAF-BK rhetoric and programme display all key characteristics of 
populism, especially its anti-establishment positioning, request to restore 
the sovereignty of the people, and allegedly representation of true public 
interests. In addition, it is non-revolutionary or non-radical and strongly 
anti-liberal (using othering strategy) as regards refugees or migrants in 
general (including guest workers). The Kollár’s personal heritage defines 
the party attitude to the right-wing Kotleba – ĽSNS. Kollár, himself part-
ly Jewish, repeatedly refused cooperation with that party until it clearly 
departed from fascism.
The WAF-BK has received many labels among analysts. Although 
some prefer to label political parties depending on their analytical needs 
(e.g. entrepreneurial party, anti-western or protest party), the WAF-BK 
is quite often independently described as a populist and/or anti-estab-
lishment protest party. Thus, populism is the key feature of this “non-
standard” party. This can also be seen in its ideological and programme 
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self-acknowledged eclecticism, as well as most recently in the joining of 
the Europe of Nations and Freedoms movement.
Considering party-ideal types, based on a political project they pur-
sue, the WAF-BK can be categorised, especially before entering the Par-
liament, as a “Purifier” or a “Challenger” and partly as a “Prolocutor” (or 
niche party). At the same time, it serves as a “Personal vehicle” for some 
personalities that could not succeed in their previous political activities 
or wanted to join politics. It is definitely not a “Prophetic” party (save for 
a single salient issue in its agenda).
Finally, this attempt of an in-depth exploratory analysis of a populist 
party shows that a dichotomous, black-white image of populist parties 
may be analytically misleading. Rather than mirroring seemingly irratio-
nal behaviour of voters, a populist party/movement reflects low political 
efficacy of political system among that segment of voters.
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Populistyczna Partia Polityczna Jesteśmy Rodziną – Boris Kollár 
 
Streszczenie
Artykuł opisuje badanie wyjaśniające dotyczące populistycznego ruchu politycz-
nego Sme rodina – Borisa Kollára (Jesteśmy Rodziną – Boris Kollár, od listopada 
2019 wyłącznie Sme rodina). W pierwszej kolejności artykuł umieszcza ruch w ge-
neralnej koncepcji sui generis rodziny partii politycznych (partia niszowa), w prze-
ciwieństwie do niektórych klasyfikacji określających ruch jako przede wszystkim 
populistyczną partię protestu, koncentrującą się na niektórych kwestiach niszowych, 
a dopiero w drugiej kolejności jako partię przedsiębiorców. Artykuł odpowiada na 
pytanie dlaczego partia uważana jest za populistyczną przez licznych politycznych 
i niepolitycznych aktorów i analityków. Artykuł również sugeruje, że w rzeczywisto-
ści nie ma zakładanego bezpośredniego związku pomiędzy poparciem dla tej partii 
a pogorszeniem się poziomu życia, jak czasem jest to przedstawiane w dyskursie 
publicznym. Wręcz przeciwnie, artykuł sugeruje, że mogą występować silniejsze po-
wiązania pomiędzy względnym ubóstwem, poczuciem opuszczenia przez polityczne 
elity/partie a niskim poziomem wykształcenia. Ponadto, istotną rolę odgrywa zna-
jomość lidera partii (o statusie celebryty), który często pojawiał się i był opisywany 
przez media bulwarowe (tabloidy). Z tego powodu, wiele młodych kobiet oddało głos 
na tę partię. Partia zaczęła również podnosić kwestie postrzegane jako problematycz-
ne, którymi poprzednie rządy i inne partie polityczne nie zajmowały się w ogóle lub 
w niewystarczającym stopniu (kwestie niszowe lub szczególnie istotne).
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